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ii.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by their attorney, Tony C. Baird, Deputy Cache County
Attorney, and tenders their Appellee Brief in this appeal pursuant to Rule 24 U.R.A.P. as
follows:

JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT:
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a3(2)(d) and (f), (1953 as amended). Pursuant to Rule 4 U.R.A.P. the Court has transferred
this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW:
Issue I: Whether Trooper Troy Denney lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the
Defendant in his vehicle on March 10, 1997.

Issue II: Whether the criminal information filed in the trial court sufficiently notified
the Defendant of the charge of Unsafe Lane Change, under U.C.A. §41-6-69(l)(a), (1953, as
amended).

Issue III: Whether the trial court committed harmless error in sustaining the State's
objection to defense counsel's questioning of Trooper Troy Denney regarding the metabolic
burn-off/absorption rate of alcohol and its relevance to the Defendant's intoxilyzer result on
the evening of March 10, 1997.

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's findings of fact in a criminal bench trial are reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard. See State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 n.2 (Utah 1988). A trial
court's finding is clearly erroneous when it is against the clear weight of the evidence or,
although there is evidence to support it, the court reviewing all the record evidence is left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 935 (Utah 1994).
A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal cases are reviewed for correctness. State
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935, 939 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah
1993). The appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to
the trial court's determination of law. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936.

GOVERNING STATUTES and RULES:
A copy of the following statutes and rules cited herein is included in Addendum A to
the Brief:
Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-44, 1953 as amended
Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-44.5, 1953 as amended
Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-69, 1953 as amended
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS:
1.

On the night of March 10, 1997, some time after 10:00 in the evening,
Trooper Troy Denney of the Utah Highway Patrol observed the Defendant's
vehicle, a Ford truck, proceeding eastbound on SR-142. (Transcript of
Suppression Hearing at 6-7). The truck was traveling slower than the speed
limit ten (10) to fifteen (15) miles per hour. This drew his attention and
Trooper Denney began to follow the truck at a distance of two to three car
lengths. He observed the truck's left hand blinker was on constantly for about
ten (10) to fifteen (15) seconds, went off and then on again. This was odd to
him. Finally, the truck made a left hand turn and began to travel northbound.
(T. at 8). It continued at a slow pace, at about twenty-five (25) miles per hour
under the speed limit. (T. at 9). The truck hugged the right side of the road
and, at one point, the truck actually left the roadway to the right without
signaling and nearly came to a complete stop. Afterwards, again without
signaling, the truck entered the roadway, and continued to travel northbound.
(T. at 9, 11).

2.

At the suppression hearing, Trooper Denney testified that he does not
generally observe vehicles driving that slowly and based upon his experience
found the signaling pattern of the truck unusual. (T. at 13-14). Trooper
Denney considered that the truck was being driven by a local farmer, possibly
looking at the rural fields. After continued observation, however, Trooper
Denney excused this as a possibility. (T. at 16).

3.

Trooper Denney testified further at the suppression hearing that he believed
3

the driver of the truck had committed a traffic offense by failing to signal
prior to leaving and entering the highway. T. at 15).
4.

After witnessing the traffic offense Trooper Denney made a traffic stop and
identified the Defendant as the driver of the truck.

5.

Subsequently, the Defendant was arrested for Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol and Open Container.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant raises three issues for appeal. First, the Defendant challenges the
legality of the stop, claiming that Trooper Denney did not possess a sufficient basis to pull
him over on March 10, 1997. The un-contro verted testimony of Trooper Denney at the
suppression hearing shows a per se traffic violation was committed in his presence.
Therefore, the trial properly denied the Defendant's motion to suppress on this ground.
Second, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the information, claiming that it
did not properly notify him of the definition of Unsafe Lane Change found in U.C.A. §41-669(l)(a), (1953, as amended). The State concedes that some language was not included from
the relevant paragraph of the statute. However, despite this, the Defendant was sufficiently
notified of the charge against him, and the record indicates that, in fact, he was aware of the
offense in its entirety.
Lastly, the Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in
sustaining the State's objection to Defense counsel's examination of Trooper Denney with
regard to the metabolic burn-off/absorption rate of alcohol in the human body and how this
related to the Defendant's B.A.C. on the March 10, 1997. For purposes of this appeal, the
4

State concedes that the trial court erred, however, the State argues that any error was
harmless.

ARGUMENT
ISSUE I:

Whether Trooper Troy Denney lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the
Defendant in his vehicle on March 10, 1997.

The Defendant argues that "it was error for the trial court to find in the Trial that
Trooper Denny had probable cause to stop the Defendant/Appellant's vehicle given that
Trooper Denney had no reasonable articulable suspicion that the Defendant/Appellant had
committed, or was about to commit, a traffic violation."1 (Appellant's Brief at 10). This
argument is not supported by Utah law or the record in this case. First, under State v. Lopez,
873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), a law enforcement officer need not have probable cause to make
a traffic stop, reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a stop.
An observed traffic violation gives the officer 'at least probable cause to
believe the citizen had committed a traffic offense.' An observed violation,
however, is not required. Stopping a vehicle may also be justified when the
officer has 'reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a
traffic offense...
In the words of the United States Supreme Court, as
long as an officer suspects that the 'driver is violating any one of the
multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulation,' the police officer
may legally stop the vehicle.
State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)(citations omitted).
Next, applying these Lopez principles to the trial court's finding of facts in the
present case, it is apparent that the trial court properly denied the Defendant's motion to
suppress. The trial court, among other findings, made the following findings of fact from the

x

The State presumes that the Defendant means the suppression hearing and not "the Trial," as the
challenge to the traffic stop was heard on May 12, 1997, not on August 8, 1997 at the trial. (T. at 5).
5

un-controverted testimony of Trooper Denney. First, the court found that Trooper Denney
observed the Defendant traveling in his truck at a slow rate of speed at a late hour of night in
a rural farm area, comprised of open fields and open roads. (T. at 26). The Defendant was
traveling at twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) miles an hour while the speed limit was fifty (50)
or fifty-five (55). Further, the court found that the Defendant traveled off the right side of
the road and then re-entered without signaling.
These facts support both an unusual driving pattern consistent with an impaired
driver and a per se traffic violation under U.C.A. §41-6-69(l)(a), (1953 as amended.2)
Trooper Denney not only had reasonable suspicion to make the stop but also had probable
cause in that he observed the two traffic violations. Therefore, the trial court properly denied
the Defendant's motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Lopez. The State respectfully
requests this Court to uphold the same.
ISSUE II: Whether the criminal information filed in the trial court sufficiently notified the
Defendant of the charge of Unsafe Lane Change, under U.C.A. §41-6-69(l)(a), (1953, as
amended).
The Defendant claims that the criminal information in this case did not provide him
with sufficient notice of the definition of the charge of Unsafe Lane Change under U.C.A.
§41-6-69(l)(a), (1953 as amended). The Defendant does not contest the trial court's finding
of fact that the Defendant failed to signal when he pulled off and then back on the highway.
(T. at 87). Again, as with the Defendant's first argument, this argument is not supported by
the law or the record in this case.

2

"A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a roadway or change lanes until the
movement can be made with reasonable safety and an appropriate signal has been given" (emphasis
added).
6

The import of the criminal information is notice to the defendant. According to Rule
4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, an information "shall charge the offense for
which the defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common
law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give
the defendant notice of the charge." "[W]hat the defendant is entitled to is an information
which sufficiently informs him to enable him to understand the charge against him and to
prepare a defense. If it fulfills that requirement, it is sufficient. It need not serve the purpose
of discovery, nor constitute a statement of legal theories or conclusions or arguments." State
v. Smathers. 602 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1979)(court found that criminal information
sufficiently notified defendant of charge against him even though it failed to expressly state
that the defendant caused serious bodily injury to the victim of a sexual assault).
In the present case, the State concedes that Count 4 of the criminal information which
charges Unsafe Lane Change failed to include the language "and an appropriate signal as
been given," a portion of the language of U.C.A. § 41-6-69(l)(a), (1953 as amended). The
question is whether without this language the information placed the Defendant on notice of
the charge against him sufficient to prepare a defense. A review of the information and the
record indicates that the Defendant was sufficiently notified of the charge to prepare a
defense. To begin, the State refers this Court to the information itself. See Addendum B.
Note, the information referred to the charge as "Unsafe Lane Change" and pinpoint cites the
charge to U.C.A. § 41-6-69(l)(a), (1953 as amended). This pinpoint cite corresponds to a
single paragraph, only thirty-four (34) words in length, which provides a single specific
mode for committing the offense of unsafe lane change. Even a cursory reading of the
paragraph would reveal that the "and an appropriate signal has been given" language is a
7

necessary element of the offense. The State presumes that counsel for the Defendant would
have at least made a cursory viewing of the statute prior to trial and observed the entire
language of the charge. For the above reasons alone, this Court should find that the criminal
information in this matter sufficiently notified the Defendant of the charge against him.
Additionally, however, the Defendant's conduct prior to and during the proceedings
in this matter indicates that in fact he and his attorney were aware of the complete definition
of the offense. One, at the suppression hearing, Trooper Denney testified that "[The
Defendant]" didn't signal to leave the road nor did he signal to reenter the road. At that time
I initiated a traffic stop." (T. at 9). In response to this testimony, the Defendant's attorney,
cross-examined Trooper Denney emphasizing the signaling issue, and asked "[D]id you
believe the defendant had committed any traffic violations?"
Answer: "At what time?"
Question: "Prior to the turn."
Answer: Yeah, I did."
Question: "Okay."
Answer: "Where he left the road and did not signal." (T. at 15).
Two, again at the suppression hearing, the State's attorney asked Trooper Denney the
following: "To the best of your knowledge pulling off to the side of the roadway without
indicating your blinker, to the best of your knowledge is that a violation of the law?"
Answer: "Yes, it is."
State's Attorney: "But did you observe him make a traffic violation?"
Answer: "Yes, I did."
State's Attorney: "And what was that?"
8

Answer: "It was that he did not use his turn signals." (T. at 20-21).
In response to this questioning of Trooper Denney, the Defendant's attorney, on recross-examination, again emphasized the signaling issue and confirmed with Trooper
Denney that failing to signal was a traffic violation in Trooper Denney's opinion. (T. at 21).
The record contains other instances where the issue of the Defendant's failure to
signal was emphasized, at times by the Defendant's attorney. See T. at 34, 51, 56 and 60.
The information sufficiently identified the charge to the Defendant for him to prepare
a defense to the charge. The information on its face pinpoint cites the statute. The record
shows the Defendant specifically treated this issue during the proceedings in this matter. It is
in genuine for the Defendant to feign insufficient notice and prejudice at this time when the
record clearly indicates knowledge of the elements of the offense. To grant the Defendant's
request would be to elevate form over substance. The State, therefore, respectfully moves
this Court to uphold the Defendant's conviction of Count 4, Unsafe Lane Change.
ISSUE III: Whether the trial court committed harmless error in sustaining the State's
objection to defense counsel's questioning of Trooper Troy Denney regarding the metabolic
burn-off/absorption rate of alcohol and its relevance to the Defendant's intoxilyzer result on
the evening of March 10, 1997.
Lastly, the Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in
sustaining the State's objection to Defense counsel's examination of Trooper Denney with
regard to the metabolic burn-off/absorption rate of alcohol in the human body and how this
related to the Defendant's B.A.C. on the March 10, 1997. In sustaining the State's objection,
the trial court held, in effect, that U.C.A. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i), (1953 as amended) raises a
conclusive presumption which limits a defendant in challenging the accuracy of the
intoxilyzer result. For purposes of this appeal, the State concedes that the trial court erred in

9

sustaining the State's objection. However, any error by the court in this particular case was
harmless and this court should uphold the Defendant's conviction under Count 2 of the
criminal information, Driving with Breath/Blood Alcohol Concentration of .08 Grams or
Greater and/or Being in Actual Physical Control, a violation of U.C.A. §41-6-44, (1953 as
amended).
The fact that a trial court commits error is not sufficient to justify the reversal of a
conviction. First, the error must be preserved for appeal and, second, the error must be
reversible error, not harmless. State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d 116, 120 (1989). When the error
involves the erroneous exclusion of evidence, an appellate court should not set aside a
verdict "unless a proffer of evidence appears of record, and [the court] believe[s] that the
excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a
different verdict. Where it is unlikely that the excluded testimony prejudiced the defendant's
rights in a substantial manner, the error is harmless and the case is not subject to reversal."
State v. Rammel 721 P.2d 498, 499-500 (Utah 1986).
In the present case, the Defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal. One, when
the State made its objection and the Court upheld the objection, the Defendant's attorney
agreed with the court's decision, stating, "That's right." (T. at 78). The Defendant took no
exception to the court's ruling. Two, the Defendant failed to make an offer of proof as
required by Rule 103(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The Defendant merely agreed
with the court and rested. (T. at 78-79).
Next, assuming the issue is preserved for appeal, the State argues that the error was
harmless. An error is harmless when "although properly preserved below and presented on
appeal, [is] sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood
10

that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Verde, 770 P.2d at 120, In the
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The State, therefore, respectfully moves this court to uphold the Defendant's
conviction under Count 2 of the information, Driving with Breath/Blood Alcohol
Concentration of .08 Grams or Greater and/or Being in Actual Physical Control, a violation
of U.C.A. §41-6-44, (1953 as amended).

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court uphold the
decision of the trial court.

lis U>
DATED this
IV day of June, 1998

Tony C. Baird

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct original and eight copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES, to the Utah Court of Appeals and two copies postage
prepaid, this bt) day of June, 1998, to the following:
GREGORY N. SKABELUND, #5346
Attorney at Law
2176 North Main Street
Logan, UT 84321

Tony C. Baird
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UT ST Sec. 41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood
alcohol concentration-Measurement of blood or breath alcohol-Criminal punishment—Arrest without
warrant—Penalties—Suspension or revocation of licen
H0905 Utah Code Sec. 41-6-44
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND
REGULATIONS
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED
AND RECKLESS DRIVING
Current through End of 1995 General and 1st Special
Sessions
Sec. 41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol,
drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol
concentration-Measurement of blood or breath
alcohol-Criminal
punishment-Arrest
without
warrant—Penalties—Suspension or revocation of
license-Penalties
(l)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the
person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given
within two hours after the alleged operation or
physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a
degree that renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or
a drug is not a defense against any charge of violating
this section.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based
upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood,
and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based
upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3)(a) A person convicted the first or second time of
a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or

Page 1

negligent manner; or
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the
vehicle at the time of the offense.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that
of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that
degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and
prudent person exercises under like or similar
circumstances.
(c) In this section, a reference to this section
includes any similar local ordinance adopted in
compliance with Section 41-6-43.
(4)(a) As part of any sentence imposed the court
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail
sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours nor
more than 240 hours.
•10906 (b) The court may, as an alternative to jail,
require the person to work in a community-service
work program for not less than 24 hours nor more
than 50 hours.
(c)(i) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall order the
person to participate in an assessment and educational
series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility, as appropriate.
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, the
court may order the person to obtain treatment at an
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility if
the licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility determines that the person has a problem
condition involving alcohol or drugs.
(5)(a) Upon a second conviction for a violation
committed within six years of a prior violation under
this section the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240
consecutive hours nor more than 720 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require
the person to work in a community-service work
program for not less than 80 hours nor more than 240
hours.

(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a
proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a

(c) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall order the
person to participate in an assessment and educational

Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 1996 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works.

UT ST Sec. 41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood
alcohol concentration-Measurement of blood or breath alcohol-Criminal punishment-Arrest without
warrant-Penalties-Suspension or revocation of licen
series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. The court may,
in its discretion, order the person to obtain treatment
at an alcohol or drag dependency rehabilitation
facility.
(6)(a) A third conviction for a violation committed
within six years of two prior violations under this
section is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor iwLqr
Subsections (ii) and (7); and

n

(ii) class A m j s ( i e m e a i l o r jf t>0th 0 f the prior
convictions are for violations committed after April
2 3 , 1990.
(b)(i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall as part
of any sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of
not less than 720 nor more than 2,160 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require
the person to work in a community-service work
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720
hours.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall order the
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate.
(c)(i) Under Subsection (a)(ii) the court shall as part
of any sentence impose a fine of not less than $1,000
and impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than
720 hours nor more than 2,160 hours.
* 10907 (ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail,
require the person to work in a community-service
work program for not less than 240 nor more than
720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on
the record the r e a s o n it finds the defendant should not
serve the jail sentence. Enrollment in and completion
of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
program approved by the court may be a sentencing
alternative to incarceration or community service if
the program provides intensive care or inpatient
treatment and long-term closely supervised follow
through after the treatment.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall order the
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug
f. op \ i i ]i 111 11 ni \\ I, I II" 111 ni I I II11111 > I
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dependency rehabilitation facility.
(7)(a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a
violation committed within six years of the prior
violations under this section is a third degree felony if
at least three prior convictions are for violations
committed after April 2 3 , 1990.
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose a
fine of not less than $1,000 and impose a mandatory
jail sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than
2,160 hours.
(c)(i) r h e court may, as an alternative to jail,
require the person to work in a community-service
work program for not less than 240 nor more than
720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on
the record the r e a s o n it finds the defendant should not
serve the jail sentence.
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by
the court may be a sentencing alternative to
incarceration or community service if the program
provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and
long-term closely supervised follow through after the
treatment.
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall order the
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility.
(8)(a) The mandatory portion of any sentence
required under this section may not be suspended and
the convicted person is not eligible for parole or
probation until any sentence imposed under this
section has been served. Probation or parole resulting
from a conviction for a violation under this section
may not be terminated.
(b) The department may not reinstate any license
suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction
under this section, until the convicted person has
furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that:
* 10908 (i) all required alcohol or drug dependency
assessment, education, treatment, and rehabilitation
ordered for a violation committed after July 1, 1993,
have been, completed;
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution
Ill" <>''II ni I \! 1 1 1 I II III III i in ni

111 [«111 II I 1 1 S t n 11 t, works.

UT ST Sec. 41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood
alcohol concentration-Measurement of blood or breath alcohol-Criminal punishment—Arrest without
warrant—Penalties—Suspension or revocation of licen
and rehabilitation costs assessed against the person
have been paid, if the conviction is a second or
subsequent conviction for a violation committed
within six years of a prior violation; and
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or
illegal manner as certified by a licensed alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation facility, if the
conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for
a violation committed within six years of two prior
violations committed after July 1, 1993.
(9)(a)(i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), (6),
and (7) that require a sentencing court to order a
convicted person to: participate in an assessment and
educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility;
obtain, in the
discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency
rehabilitation
facility;
obtain,
mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility;
or do any
combination of those things, apply to a conviction for
a violation of Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior
conviction under Subsection (10).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding
education or treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility, or both, in
connection with a first, second, or subsequent
conviction under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a
prior conviction under Subsection (10), as the court
would render in connection with applying
respectively, the first, second, or subsequent
conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), (6),
and (7).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a
conviction under Section 41-6-45 that qualified as a
prior conviction under Subsection (10), is a first,
second, or subsequent conviction under this
subsection, a previous conviction under either this
section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a prior
conviction.
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
program and any community-based or other education
program provided for in this section shall be approved
by the Department of Human Services.
(10)(a)(i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of
guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of
Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under
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Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute
for, an original charge of a violation of this section,
the prosecution shall state for the record a factual
basis for the plea, including whether or not there had
been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination
of both, by the defendant in connection with the
violation.
* 10909 (ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the
facts that shows whether there was consumption of
alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant, in connection with the violation.
(b)(i) The court shall advise the defendant before
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the
consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-45 as
follows.
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty
or no contest to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45,
and the prosecutor states for the record that there was
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant in connection with the
violation, the resulting conviction is a prior conviction
for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and (7).
(c) The court shall notify the department of each
conviction of Section 41-6-45 that is a prior offense
for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and (7).
(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest
a person for a violation of this section when the
officer has probable cause to believe the violation has
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the
officer has probable cause to believe that the violation
was committed by the person.
(12)(a) The Department of Public Safety shall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a
person convicted for the first time under Subsection
(1); and
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person
convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection
(1) if the violation is committed within a period of six
years from the date of the prior violation.
(b) The department shall subtract from any
suspension or revocation period the number of days
for which a license was previously suspended under
Section 53-3-223, if the previous suspension was
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UT ST Sec. 41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood
alcohol concentration-Measurement of blood or breath alcohol-Criminal punishment-Arrest without
warrant-Penalties-Suspension or revocation of licen
based on the same occurrence upon which the record
of conviction is based.
As last amended by Chapters 159 and 263, Laws of
Utah 1994
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UT ST Sec. 41-6-69, Turning or changing lanes-Safety-Signals-Stopping or sudden decrease in
speed—Signal flashing-Where prohibited
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•10962 Utah Code Sec. 41-6-69
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND
REGULATIONS
ARTICLE 8. TURNS AND SIGNALS ON
STARTING, STOPPING OR TURNING
Current through End of 1995 General and 1st Special
Sessions
Sec. 41-6-69. Turning or changing lanes-SafetySignals-Stopping or sudden decrease in speedSignal flashing-Where prohibited
(l)(a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right
or left upon a roadway or change lanes until the
movement can be made with reasonable safety and an
appropriate signal has been given.

(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to
change lanes shall be given continuously for at least
the last three seconds preceding the beginning of the
turn or change.
(2) A person may not stop or suddenly decrease the
speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate
signal to the operator of any vehicle immediately to
the rear when there is opportunity to give a signal.
(3) The signals required on vehicles by Section
41-6-70 may not be flashed on one side only on a
disabled vehicle, flashed as a courtesy or "do pass" to
operators of other vehicles approaching from the rear,
or flashed on one side only of a parked vehicle except
as necessary to comply with this section.
As last amended by Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1987.
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WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Current with amendments received through
11-15-97
RULE 4.
OFFENSES

PROSECUTION
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(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall
be prosecuted by indictment or information sworn
to by a person having reason to believe the
offense has been committed.
(b) An indictment or information shall charge
the offense for which the defendant is being
prosecuted by using the name given to the offense
by common law or by statute or by stating in
concise terms the definition of the offense
sufficient to give the defendant notice of the
charge. An information may contain or be
accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to
make out probable cause to sustain the offense
charged where appropriate. Such things as time,
place, means, intent, manner, value and
ownership need not be alleged unless necessary to
charge the offense.
Such things as money,
securities, written instruments, pictures, statutes
and judgments may be described by any name or
description by which they are generally known or
by which they may be identified without setting
forth a copy. However, details concerning such
things may be obtained through a bill of
particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor
matters of judicial notice need be stated.
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper
language from an indictment or information.
(d) The court may permit an indictment or
information to be amended at any time before
verdict if no additional or different offense is
charged and the substantial rights of the defendant
are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or
information may be amended so as to state the
offense with such particularity as to bar a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon
the same set of facts.

(e) When Lias not set out in an information or
indictment are required to inform a defendant of
the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as
to enable him to prepare his defense, the
defendant may file a written motion for a bill of
particulars.
The motion shall be filed at
arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at
such later time as the court may permit. The court
may, on its own motion, direct the filing of a. bill
of particulars. A bill of particulars may be
amended or supplemented at any time subject to
such conditions as justice may require. The
request for and contents of a bill of particulars
shall be limited to a statement of factual
information needed to set forth the essential
elements of the particular offense charged.
*332 (f) An indictment or information shall not
be held invalid because any name contained
therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated.
(g) It shall i lot be necessary to negate any
exception, excuse or proviso contained in the
statute creating or defining the offense.
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed
according to their usual meaning unless they are
otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal
meaning.
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the
conjunctive shall not invalidate the indictment or
information.
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence
an indictment or information was based shall be
endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to
endorse shall not affect the validity but
endorsement shall be ordered by the court on
application of the defendant. Upon request the
prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a showing
of good cause, furnish the names of other
witnesses he proposes to call whose names are not
so endorsed.
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons
shall issue directing it to appear before the
magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or
counsel. Proceedings against a corporation shall
be the same as against a natural person.
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REV Rule 103, RULE 103. RULINGS ON EVIDENCE
*390 Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in
question and answer form.

RULE 103. RULINGS ON EVIDENCE

(c) Hearing of Jury. In jury cases, proceedings
shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as
to prevent inadmissible evidence from being
suggested to the jury by any means, such as
making statements or offers of proof or asking
questions in the hearing of the jury.

(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not
be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the
party is affected, and

(d) Plain Error. Nothing in this rule precludes
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial
rights although they were not brought to the
attention of the court.

(1) Objection.
In case the ruling is one
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion
to strike appears of record, stating the specific
ground of objection, if the specific ground was
not apparent from the context; or

Advisory Committee Note

Current with amendments received through
11-15-97

(2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the
evidence was made known to the court by offer
or was apparent from the context within which
questions were asked.
(b) Record of Offer and Ruling. The court may
add any other or further statement which shows
the character of the evidence, the form in which it
was offered, the objection made, and the ruling

Rule 103 is the federal rule, verbatim, and is in
conformity with Rules 4 and 5, Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971), Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Utah case law not involving
constitutional considerations. Subsection (a)(1) is
in accord with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) and Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20 Utah
2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). See also Bradford
v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980);
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981).
Rule 103(d) is a restatement of the plain error
rule. See Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) and State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441
P.2d 512 (1968).
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
:tq
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

) INFORMATION

vs.
) Circuit Ct. No.
) District Ct. No.

q-W HR^

BOYD LEE PREECE,
DOB: 07/09/42
Defendant.
The STATE OF UTAH, upon evidence and belief, charges the
above-named Defendant with the commission of the following public
offenses:
COUNT 1
CRIME:
IN VIOLATION OF:
CLASSIFICATION:
AT:
ON OR ABOUT:

Operating or Being in Actual Physical Control
of a Vehicle While Under the Influence of
Alcohol and/or Drugs
Section 41-6-44 U.C.A. 1953, as amended
Class B Misdemeanor
Cache County, State of Utah
March 10, 1997

The acts of the Defendant constituting the public offense were:
That the said Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, did
wilfully and unlawfully operate or was in actual physical
control of a vehicle in the State of Utah while under the
influence of alcohol and/or drugs to a degree which rendered
him incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
COUNT 2:
CRIME
IN VIOLATION OF:
CLASSIFICATION:
AT:
ON OR ABOUT:

Driving
with
Breath/Blood
Alcohol
Concentration of .08 grams or Greater and/or
Being in Actual Physical Control
Section 41-6-44 U.C.A. 1953, as amended
Class B Misdemeanor
Cache County, State of Utah
March 10, 1997

m i -11?

-j_-n^_:.t constituting the public offense were:
That the said Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, did
wilfully and unlawfully operate or was in actual physical
control of a vehicle in the State of Utah with a breath/blood
alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater.
COUNT 3:
CRIME:
IN VIOLATION OF:
CLASSIFICATION:
AT:
ON OR ABOUT:

Open Container of Alcohol in Vehicle
Section 41-6-44.20 U.C.A. 1953, as amended
Class C Misdemeanor
Cache County, State of Utah
March 10, 1997

The acts of the Defendant constituting the public offense were:
That the said Defendant, on the d^v ,^id place aforesaid, did
keep, carry, possess, transport, or allow another to keep,
carry, possess, or transport in the passenger compartment of
a motor vehicle, when the vehicle is on any highway, any
container which contains any alcoholic beverage and the
container has been opened, its seal broken, or the contents of
the container partially consumed.
COUNT 4:
CRIME:
IN V I O L A T I O N O F :
CLASSIFICATION:
AT:
ON OR ABOUT:
Thp

• f

c

h

Unsafe Lane Change
Section 41-6-69(1)(a U.C.A. 1953, as amended
Class C Misdemeanor
Cache County, State of
March 10, 1997
' N-fendr j

in-
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That the said Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid,
driver of a vehicle, did move right or left upon a roadway or
change lanes, when such movement could not be made with
reasonable safety.

This information is based on evidence obtained from the following
witnesses: T. Denney, F. Peterson.
&£>
Dated: April /r****-. 1 997.
DEPUTY CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY

Drap
Date Filed: April
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